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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, I wrote an article1 on the treatment of appropriation 
artists2 under the Copyright Act of 1976 (the Act).3 The thrust of 
the article was that copyright law was suppressing appropriation 
art.4 This was happening because the Act did not recognize the 
circumstances of the late twentieth century, when a significant 
chunk of the aesthetic vocabulary of the day was privately owned.5 
Many artists were targeting popular culture, but that was becoming 
difficult to do when most of that culture was owned by litigious 
cultural landlords who stood ready to bring copyright infringement 
actions against anyone using their “property.” The article predicted 
that appropriation artists would “abandon their art” if some 
solution was not devised.6 The article provided one such solution7 
in the form of a narrowly tailored copyright privilege extending to 
the creation of “works of visual art” as defined in the Copyright 
Act—works of painting or sculpture that are created in single 
copies or editions of not more than 200.8 
My earlier article was written seventeen years ago. In this 
article, I will revisit the circumstances of appropriation subject 
artists to see how the law has evolved and whether they are freer to 
create than they were in the late 1990s. In particular, although the 
Supreme Court in 1994 clearly sent a signal that “transformation” 
                                                
1 Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist’s Privilege, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 249 
(1997).  
2 “Appropriation in art and art history refers to the practice of artists using pre-
existing objects or images in their art with little transformation of the original.” 
Appropriation, TATE, http://www.tate.org.uk/learn/online-resources/glossary/a/appropriation (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2014). 
3 See Act for the General Revision of the Copyright Law (Copyright Act of 1976), 
ch. 17, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–
810 (2012)). 
4 Schaumann, supra note 1, at 249–51. 
5 Id. at 252–54. 
6 Id. at 273. 
7 See id. at 274–80. 
8 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “work of visual art”). 
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of the copied work would be important in fair use cases,9 this idea 
had not been applied to appropriation art cases. How, then, has 
“transformation” affected appropriation art? Does appropriation art 
still pose a challenge to copyright law? 
Although I will build on my earlier article, I will not assume 
familiarity with it. This article stands on its own. Whereas An 
Artist’s Privilege investigated a number of different alternatives to 
the treatment of appropriation art under the Copyright Act, the 
current article looks only at the changes in the fair use doctrine and 
discusses whether those changes would suffice to make a privilege 
like the one suggested in the earlier article unnecessary.  
Part I provides some background regarding aesthetic 
vocabulary in the arts, and traces the use of appropriated images in 
the twentieth- and twenty-first centuries. Part II discusses the 
general application of copyright law to appropriation art. Part III 
examines the current status of the fair use cases that address 
appropriation art and concludes that the fair use results are better 
than before, largely because of the ascendancy of 
“transformativeness” as an important fair use factor. It also 
concludes, however, that fair use remains insufficient to protect 
appropriation art. Finally, Part IV re-proposes a solution—an 
exception to copyright, limited to fine art—grounded in the public 
benefit of dissemination of knowledge and the lack of damage to 
the original author’s economic interest resulting from 
appropriation art. 
II. AESTHETIC VOCABULARY 
Aesthetic vocabulary changes with the times. Voluptuous 
female nudes are no longer a common subject of painters; neither 
are religious allegories. Art today is more openly critical of the 
culture in which it arises, and it does so in many cases by referring 
explicitly to that culture. This section will briefly review the 
                                                
9 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994). 
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history of appropriation as an artistic technique.10 The art historian 
will no doubt see this as woefully inadequate, but for legal 
purposes it will suffice.  
Beginning in the early twentieth century, artists began to take 
objects from their surroundings for incorporation into works of art, 
for example the collages of Picasso and Braques.11 These collages 
were followed by the use of industrially-manufactured objects that 
were complete, stood alone, and were identified as art. Marcel 
Duchamp’s “ready-mades” famously included a piece titled 
“Fountain,” consisting of a men’s urinal atop a pedestal, signed “R. 
Mutt 1917.”12  
The use of objects from the environment was continued by the 
Surrealists. Meret Oppenheim’s Object is a cup, saucer, and 
spoon—covered in the fur of a Chinese gazelle.13 Soon, however, 
artists began to appropriate the works of other artists as subject 
matter, rather than pre-existing utilitarian objects. In 1938, Joseph 
Cornell—who had become infatuated with the actress Rose 
Hobart—purchased a print of the B-movie East of Borneo 
featuring the actress, removed all the sections of the film in which 
                                                
10 A similarly brief exposition of this subject can be found on the Tate Gallery 
web site. TATE, supra note 2.  
11 Both artists were responsible for introducing collages, or papiers collés, into 
fine art in 1912. Pablo Picasso used newspaper clippings to create forms. See, for 
example, Bottle of Vieux Marc, Glass, Guitar, and Newspaper, which may be viewed 
at Tate online.  Pablo Picasso, Bottle of Vieux Marc, Glass, Guitar, and Newspaper, 
TATE, http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/picasso-bottle-of-vieux-marc-glass-guitar-
and-newspaper-t00414 (last visited Nov. 2, 2014).  
12 Shelley Esaak, Special Exhibition Gallery: Dada at MoMA—New York, 
ABOUT EDUCATION (2014), available at 
http://arthistory.about.com/od/dada/ig/DadaatMoMANewYork/dada_newyork_0
7.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2014)(showing an original photograph of the work 
taken by Alfred Stieglitz). 
13 An image of this work, and its gallery label text, are available at the Museum of 
Modern Art website. Meret Oppenheim, Object, MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, 
http://www.moma.org/collection/object.php?object_id=80997 (last visited Nov. 2, 
2014).  
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she did not appear, and projected what was left at silent-film speed 
through a blue-tinted lens with a new soundtrack from a record 
album he had purchased. He called this work Rose Hobart.14  
Twenty years later, more film works were appropriated. The 
year 1958 saw two works that consisted of appropriated images: A 
Movie, by Bruce Connor,15 and the film Cowboy and Indian, by 
Raphael Montanez Ortiz.16  Connor’s film used found footage and 
pre-recorded sounds to present a meditation on sex, war, and the 
nature of the film medium. 17  Ortiz cut apart footage from a 
Western film, threw the cut-up pieces in a bag, and then randomly 
pulled out pieces of the film and spliced the parts together to create 
a new work.18  
In the 1960s, the Pop Art movement began to appropriate 
images from popular culture. Roy Lichtenstein’s Look Mickey,19 
painted in 1961, takes an image from a Little Golden Book 
featuring Donald Duck.20 Later, Lichtenstein painted images in his 
                                                
14 Vivian Sobchak, Nostalgia for a Digital Object: Regrets on the Quickening of 
QuickTime, Nordicom Review 29, 37 (2004), available at 
http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/kapitel-pdf/134_029-038.pdf. The film 
Rose Hobart is available on YouTube. Joseph Cornell, Rose Hobart, YouTube (July 
15, 2012) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pQxtZlQlTDA.   
15 David Conner Haney, Documentary, Postmodernism, and La Mémoire des 
anges, OFFSCREEN (July 2011) http://offscreen.com/view/documentary_postmodernism.   
16 Rocío Aranda-Alvarado, Unmaking: The Work of Raphael Montañez Ortiz, 
JERSEY CITY MUSEUM, (Feb.-Aug. 2007), 
http://centropr.hunter.cuny.edu/sites/default/files/Interview%20with%20Ortiz.pdf. 
17 Haney, supra note 15.  
18 Aranda-Alvarado, supra note 16, at 33. 
19 An image of the painting appears at the National Gallery of Art website. Roy 
Lichtenstein, Look Mickey, NATIONAL GALLERY OF ART, 
http://www.nga.gov/content/ngaweb/Collection/art-object-page.71479.html (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2014).  
20 An image of the painting may be viewed in the public domain. CARL 
BUETTNER, DONALD DUCK LOST AND FOUND (1960), available at 
http://www.nga.gov/content/dam/ngaweb/Education/learning-resources/an-eye-for-
art/AnEyeforArt-RoyLichtenstein.pdf.  
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comic-book style based on paintings by Picasso.21 Picasso, too, 
appropriated: in 1957, he painted his Las Meninas series—a suite 
of fifty-eight paintings reinterpreting Las Meninas by Diego 
Velazquez.22 
The 1960s also brought Pop Art icon Andy Warhol, whose 
silkscreened images of flowers on the walls of Leo Castelli’s 
gallery generated what might be the first lawsuit based on artistic 
appropriation.23 Even Roy Lichtenstein’s appropriation of Disney 
characters, noted above, did not provoke a lawsuit. The case 
against Warhol was settled out of court, with Warhol agreeing to a 
royalty for future uses of Caulfield’s work.24 Warhol also gave 
Caulfield two of the silkscreened flower pieces.25 
                                                
21 An image of one of the paintings may be viewed at Christie’s website. Roy 
Lichtenstein, Woman with Flowered Hat, CHRISTIE’S 
http://www.christies.com/lotfinder/paintings/roy-lichtenstein-woman-with-flowered-
hat-5684070-details.aspx (last visited Nov. 3, 2014). This painting sold for more than 
$56 million at Christie’s in May 2013. The Picasso original, which sold for more than 
$95 million in 2006, can be viewed on Wikipedia. Pablo Picasso, Dora Maar au Chat, 
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dora_Maar_au_Chat (last visited Nov. 3, 
2014).  
22  These paintings may be viewed at BCN.CAT, 
http://www.bcn.cat/museupicasso/swf/en/lacoleccio/meninas/meninas.html (last 
visited Nov. 3, 2014); Diego Velazquez, Las Meninas-Picasso, LAS MENINAS, 
http://www.velazquezlasmeninas.com/las-meninas-picasso.html (last visited Nov. 3, 
2014).  
23 Warhol was sued by Patricia Caulfield, whose copyrighted photograph of four 
poppies Warhol found in an issue of Modern Photography. Warhol enlarged the image 
and had it professionally silk-screened onto canvases that were then painted in bright, 
often unrealistic colors by Warhol's friends and associates at his studio, “the Factory.” 
The resulting series of approximately 1,000 works, entitled Flowers, were shown in the 
Leo Castelli gallery and eventually licensed as posters. Caulfield discovered Warhol's 
unauthorized use when she came across the posters in a New York City bookstore. 
One of Warhol's biographers claims that Caulfield was not concerned about the 
infringement to her work, but rather that she “had been prompted to sue him when she 
heard that Andy was ‘rich.’” Emily Meyers, Art on Ice: The Chilling Effect of 
Copyright on Artistic Expression, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 219, 225–26 (2007).  
24 Id. at 226.  
25 Id.  
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At the same time, Elaine Sturtevant was copying the works of 
other artists, meticulously reproducing the technique and results 
obtained by others. It is frequently difficult to spot a Sturtevant; 
her works are superb repetitions of the works of others.26  When 
questioned intensively about his own technique, Warhol reportedly 
said, “I don’t know. Ask Elaine.”27 Sturtevant herself summed up 
her purpose by saying, “I create vertigo.”28 Although she was 
creating since the 1960s, Sturtevant, unlike Warhol, was not sued 
for copying others’ works, although she reportedly annoyed Claes 
Oldenburg severely when she copied his Store.29  
By 1975, Richard Prince was re-photographing images taken 
from cigarette advertisements, 30  the beginning of a career of 
appropriation that by 2012 had extended to a complete 
appropriation of the novel The Catcher in the Rye, identical in 
every way to the original first edition, except that the author’s 
name had been changed from J.D. Salinger to Richard Prince.31 
                                                
26  See Andrew Russeth, Sturtevant, Uncompromising Progenitor of 
Appropriation Art, Has Died, N. Y. OBSERVER (May 7, 2014, 9:43 PM), 
http://observer.com/2014/05/sturtevant-uncompromising-progenitor-of-appropriation-
has-died/.   
27 Margalit Fox, Elaine Sturtevant, Who Borrowed Others’ Work Artfully, Is Dead 
at 89, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2014, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/17/arts/design/elaine-sturtevant-appropriation-artist-
is-dead-at-89.html.  
28 Id.  
29 Christopher Bagley, Sturtevant: Repeat Offender, W (May 8, 2014, 8:12 PM), 
http://www.wmagazine.com/people/2014/05/sturtevant-moma-retrospective/photos/.  
30 One example from 1989 can be seen at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. 
THOMAS P. CAMPBELL, THE METROPOLITAN MUSEUM ART GUIDE 448 (Michael 
Sittenfeld & Robert Weisberg ed., 2012), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=3C4AFXFLmZEC (last visited Nov. 2, 2014); 
Richard Prince, Untitled (Cowboy), METMUSEUM, 
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/works-of-art/2000.272 (last visited Nov. 2, 2014). 
31  Kenneth Goldsmith, Richard Prince’s Latest Act of Appropriation: The 
Catcher in the Rye, POETRY FOUNDATION (Apr. 19, 2012),   
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2012/04/richard-princes-latest-act-of-
appropriation-the-catcher-in-the-rye/. 
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Along the way, Prince created the works shown in his Canal Zone 
exhibition, which prompted a lawsuit from photographer Patrick 
Cariou, thirty-five of whose photographs were used in Prince’s 
exhibition.32  
The 1980s saw the adoption of the term “appropriation art” in 
the art world.33 Sherrie Levine photographed the work of other 
photographers (while scrupulously identifying the originals and 
distinguishing them from her own work).34 Jeff Koons took images 
from popular culture, recreating them in sculpture, painting, and 
collage.35 He was sued for copyright infringement three times in 
the late 1980s, and lost each case. 36 In 2006, Koons finally won a 
case, based on his “transformation” of the appropriated work.37  
The foregoing short history demonstrates that the practice of 
appropriating objects and images from the world surrounding the 
artist has a distinguished and lengthy pedigree. So common is 
appropriation in the art world that a 2010 exhibition at the New 
Museum in New York, entitled Free, was built “partly around the 
                                                
32 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
618, (2013).  
33 See TATE, supra note 2; Sven Lütticken, The Feathers of the Eagle, 36 NEW 
LEFT REV. 109, 109 (2005), available at 
http://dspace.ubvu.vu.nl/bitstream/handle/1871/21431/182536.pdf?sequence=2.  
34 See Schaumann, supra note 1, at 250; see also John Carlin, Culture Vultures: 
Artistic Appropriate and Intellectual Property Law Review, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & 
ARTS 103, 103–04 (1988); Gerald Marzorati, Art in the (Re)making, ARTNEWS, May 
1986, at 90, 97. “Copying such images, whether or not for artistic purposes, is likely to 
result in litigation.” Schaumann, supra note 1, at 254; see, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 
F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 
(S.D.N.Y 1993); Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055(RO), 1993 WL 97381, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993). 
35 See Schaumann, supra note 1, at 251; Rogers, 960 F.2d at 304–306. 
36 See, e.g., Rogers, 960 F.2d at 301; United Feature Syndicate, Inc, 817 F. Supp. 
at 370; Campbell, 1993 WL 97381, at *1. 
37 Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that Koons's 
appropriation of Blanch's photograph was fair use). 
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very idea of the borrowing culture.”38 Nevertheless, beginning in 
1965 with the lawsuit against Andy Warhol, 39  copyright 
infringement cases against artists who reuse images have 
proliferated.  
III. COPYRIGHT LAW AND APPROPRIATION ART 
It is the nature of appropriation art that the subject matter is 
copied.40 When that subject matter is a copyrighted work, the artist 
commits at least one infringement under the Copyright Act, and 
likely more.41 This is not something exclusive to the 1976 Act, as 
the (pre-1976) lawsuit against Andy Warhol noted above makes 
clear. However, after the Act became effective on January 1, 1978, 
a new copyright regime took hold. The 1976 Act attempted, as 
nearly as possible, to fully allocate the right to engage in every 
feasible use of a copyrighted work to the owner.42 Under this 
scheme, exceptions were narrowly drawn to serve the interests of 
existing users.43 There were few gray areas, and the only way in 
which a user might legally use a copyrighted work without 
permission was under the fair use doctrine, codified for the first 
time in section 107 of the new Act.44 
Just a few years after the new Act became effective, artists 
were continuing and extending the tradition of copying from pre-
existing works. By the 1980s, the term “appropriation art” came 
                                                
38 Randy Kennedy, Apropos Appropriation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2012, at AR1, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/arts/design/richard-prince-lawsuit-
focuses-on-limits-of-appropriation.html?pagewanted=all.  
39 See supra notes 23–25. 
40 TATE, supra note 2. 
41 At a minimum, they violate the Act’s prohibition against unlawful copying. 17 
U.S.C. § 106(1). In addition, many appropriation art cases include the use of a work as 
part of the later artist’s work, as well as the public display of the work, implicating 17 
U.S.C. §§ 106(2) and 106(5). See generally Schaumann, supra note 1, at 254–56 
nn.19–24. 
42 See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 37 (Prometheus Books, 2006). 
43 Id. 
44 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
10
Cybaris®, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/cybaris/vol6/iss1/5
 
 
 
[6:112 2015]  CYBARIS®, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 121  
 LAW REVIEW 
 121 
into use and while the art was visually similar to the earlier 
varieties of copied art, the context and culture were different. The 
innocence and playfulness of the earlier copying seemed no longer 
to exist: appropriation art had become edgy, self-conscious, and it 
seemed (sometimes, at least) knowingly to infringe copyright. 
Consider the Jeff Koons’s 1988 Banality show: the title of the 
show identifies the subjects as banal, which is to say, lacking 
utterly in originality.  Copyright, of course, protects only original 
works of authorship. Yet, the artist’s copies of the banal works of 
others were held to infringe copyright.45 Koons’s infringing works 
were different from Roy Lichtenstein’s Look Mickey, which retains 
a genuine innocence despite copying Disney characters. When 
Koons copied cartoon characters, they were implicated in sexual 
activities.46 The controversy this generated was hardly accidental: 
Koons’s Made In Heaven show, following immediately in the 
footsteps of the Banality show, contained many works that 
graphically depict Koons and his then-wife, porn star Ilona Staller, 
having sex.47  
Sherrie Levine was another conspicuously transgressive artist 
who became known in the 1980s. Her 1980 show, After Walker 
Evans, featured works she created by re-photographing catalog 
images out of a Walker Evans exhibition catalog. She exhibited 
                                                
45 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992); United Feature 
Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Campbell v. Koons, 
91 CIV. 6055 (RO), 1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y., Apr. 1, 1993). 
46 See, for example, the artist’s description of his work entitled “Pink Panther,” as 
quoted in a 1992 Taschen Books retrospective of Koons’s work: “Pink Panther is 
about masturbation.” ECKHARD SCHNEIDER ET AL., JEFF KOONS 113 (Angelika 
Muthesius ed.) (1992). 
47 See id. at 124–61; see also Tom Leonard, Porn star La Cicciolina sues ex-
husband Jeff Koons for child support, THE TELEGRAPH, Mar. 27, 2008 available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1583034/Porn-star-La-Cicciolina-sues-ex-
husband-Jeff-Koons-for-child-support.html. Although the Made in Heaven works 
were controversial, they were not alleged to appropriate from other images or to 
infringe copyright. 
11
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these photographs as her own art.48 While Jeff Koons was sued 
several times, Levine was merely threatened with a lawsuit. 
Eventually, the Walker Evans estate simply bought Levine’s works 
and declined to exhibit them.49 
When I wrote my 1997 article, Koons and Levine were the two 
artists I chose to represent appropriation art. Since then, however, 
appropriation has become more, not less, common. Many other 
artists are copying in order to make their artistic statements. The 
Wikipedia entry for “appropriation art” includes a list of “notable” 
artists using appropriation techniques; the list contains a hundred 
names.50 
The fact that there are a hundred or more artists who practice 
appropriation can mean different things to different readers. Some 
might take it as a sign that copyright law is irrelevant to the actions 
of artists, who don’t care about copyright if their chosen means of 
expressions leads them toward infringement. Others might say the 
fact that only a hundred artists have been brave enough to face 
litigation (out of all the artists in the world) is evidence that 
copyright has chilled artistic expression.  
While the actions of artists may be ambiguous, the purpose of 
copyright is not. It is stated in the Constitution: “To promote the 
                                                
48 See Biography: Sherry Levine, ARTNET, http://www.artnet.com/artists/sherrie-
levine/biography (last visited Oct. 28, 2014). However, the title of the show indicates 
the provenance of the images. Her practice of signifying appropriated subjects by using 
the word “After” in the title has continued throughout her career. Some of her other 
artworks based on appropriation include After Miro; Equivalents: After Stieglitz 1-18; 
After August Sander; and others. See Artworks: Sherry Levine, ARTNET, (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2014). Levine’s work questions traditional concepts of originality: where is 
originality, in a photograph (by Levine) of a photograph (by the catalog photographer) 
of a photograph of people posing (by Walker Evans)?  In other words, each of the 
photographers created an image of something that already existed, either in nature or in 
someone else’s photograph. Why are some of these images “original” and others not? 
49 See id.  
50  Appropriation (art), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Appropriation 
(art) (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). 
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progress of Science . . . .”51  The term “Progress of Science” is 
used in its eighteenth-century sense, meaning the dissemination or 
spread of knowledge.52 Copyright accomplishes this purpose “by 
securing for limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to 
their . . . Writings . . . .”53 Restated, then, copyright exists to further 
the dissemination of knowledge, and it does so by providing 
authors with exclusive rights in their original works of authorship. 
Note, however, that the primary purpose (to disseminate 
knowledge) can easily be at odds with the secondary purpose (to 
secure rights to authors). The conflict arises because securing 
rights to authors limits dissemination; the requirement of obtaining 
(and often paying for) the right to do something with the author’s 
work implies that such rights will be exercised less often than if no 
permission or payment were required. 
In the absence of any provision expressly exempting art from 
copyright law, how is the tension between the primary and 
secondary purposes of copyright to be resolved in the case of 
appropriation art? The usual crucible in which such outcomes are 
forged is litigation under the fair use doctrine. In a fair use case, a 
user asserts the right to use a work without seeking permission or 
paying a fee; the copyright owner claims that such a use is 
infringement. The user’s case asserts the primacy of the 
dissemination of knowledge or the “Progress of Science,” while 
the copyright owner emphasizes the “exclusive Rights” granted by 
copyright. Fair use cases determine, on the facts before the court, 
which purpose shall prevail. 
                                                
51 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
52 See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 888 (2012) (“The ‘Progress of 
Science,’petitioners acknowledge, refers broadly to ‘the creation and spread of 
knowledge and learning.’”); see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 n.18 
(2003) (citing Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 
1992)), aff'd, 60 F.3d 913 (C.A.2 1994) (“Accordingly, ‘copyright law celebrates the 
profit motive, recognizing that the incentive to profit from the exploitation of 
copyrights will redound to the public benefit by resulting in the proliferation of 
knowledge . . . . The profit motive is the engine that ensures the progress of science.’”). 
53 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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Fair use is thus a potentially powerful antidote to the rights that 
belong to the copyright owner. Fair use is appropriation artists’ 
best hope for escaping liability. It is no surprise, then, that most of 
the scholarly discussion over the application of copyright law to 
appropriation art has focused on the application of the fair use 
doctrine. Indeed, of the various approaches that might be used, fair 
use is the only one that has been applied by courts.54 
The next part of this article will consider the rise of 
transformativeness in the law of fair use to see if the trend in the 
cases since 1997 is less oppressive to art than it was previously. If 
so, then perhaps the difficulties besetting appropriation artists have 
been mitigated.  
IV. FAIR USE AND APPROPRIATION ART 
The law of fair use was first codified in the United States when 
the Copyright Act of 1976 was passed. Section 107 lays out the 
defense:  
Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including 
such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords 
or by any other means specified by that section, for 
purposes such as criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for 
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an 
infringement of copyright. In determining whether 
the use made of a work in any particular case is a 
fair use the factors to be considered shall include— 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is 
for nonprofit educational purposes; 
                                                
54 My 1997 article described some other possibilities, some of which had been 
suggested by contemporary commentators, including compulsory license and the 
unlikely expedient of abandoning copyright altogether. See Schaumann, supra note 1, 
at 271–75. 
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(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used 
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for or value of the copyrighted work.55 
Although the four factors listed are non-exclusive, each must 
be included in the fair use analysis.56 In the case law interpreting 
section 107, two factors stand out as the most important: the 
purpose and character of the use (factor one),57 and the market 
impact of the use on the market for the copied work (factor four).58 
A heavy market impact (for example, the defendant selling her 
works in direct competition with the plaintiff) tends to weigh 
against fair use; light or no impact, in favor of fair use.59 
A. Purpose and Character of the Use 
The first of the key factors—the “purpose and character” of the 
use—has evolved over the Act’s first thirty-six years.60 The Act 
                                                
55 Copyright Act of 1976, ch. 17, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)). 
56 Id. (“[T]he factors to be considered shall include . . . .”) (emphasis added). In 
other words, consideration of the factors stated in section 107 is mandatory (“shall”); 
also, the factors are non-exclusive (“include”). 
57 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 589 (1994); Sony 
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 496 (1984) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting); see also BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 68 
(Columbia University Press 1967); Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990). 
58 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 590–94; Harper & Row 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 (1985) (“This . . . factor is 
undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”); Salinger v. Random 
House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1997); Leval, supra note 57. 
59 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 471 U.S. at 603.  
60 See An Act for the General Revision of the Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 
90 Stat. 2541 (1976). The Copyright Act of 1976 became effective in 1978, 36 years 
before this article was written. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1) (West, Westlaw through 
2014).  
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states that in determining “purpose and character,” a court must 
address “whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 
nonprofit educational purposes.” 61  Predictably, then, the early 
cases focused on whether the use was commercial or not.62  
But the purpose and character of the use can obviously be more 
complicated than simply whether the use is commercial or not. In 
1990, then-District Judge Pierre N. Leval wrote an article in the 
Harvard Law Review that dynamited the notion that the purpose 
and character of the use was mostly about commerciality.63 Leval’s 
seminal article argued instead that analysis of the purpose and 
character of the use should focus on whether the use was 
transformative. By transforming the prior work, the later artist adds 
something creative, which justifies the copying.64 
Judge Leval’s article laid the foundation for the analysis of 
transformation in fair use. But it was the Supreme Court’s explicit 
approval in Campbell65 that transformed Leval’s idea into law.66 
The Campbell court described the purpose of analysis under the 
                                                
61 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(1).  
62 See Harper & Row Publishers., Inc., 471 U.S. at 562 (“The fact that a 
publication was commercial as opposed to nonprofit is a separate factor that tends to 
weigh against a finding of fair use.” ); Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451 (“[E]very 
commercial use . . . is presumptively . . . unfair”). Ten years after Sony, however, the 
Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose noted that “the mere fact that a use is educational and 
not for profit does not insulate it from a finding of infringement, any more than the 
commercial character of a use bars a finding of fairness.” 510 U.S. at 584. 
63 Leval, supra note 57, at 1116 n.53 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1982))(“The 
interpretation of the first factor is complicated by the mention in the statute of a 
distinction based on ‘whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes.’ One should not exaggerate the importance of this distinction.”).  
64 See id. at 1111. 
65 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572 (1994) (“I believe the 
answer to the question of justification [of fair use] turns primarily on whether, and to 
what extent, the challenged use is transformative. The use must be product and must 
employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the 
original.”).  
66 Id. at 579. 
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first fair use factor as determining “whether the new work merely 
‘supersede[s] the objects’ of the original creation,”67 or whether the 
use “adds something new, with a different purpose or different 
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or 
message . . . in other words, whether and to what extent the new 
work is ‘transformative.’”68 After Campbell, transformation was at 
the heart of fair use. 
How does a court determine whether a use is transformative? 
One obvious approach is to assess the changes made to the original 
work by the secondary user.69 But courts have also considered the 
context in which the original work appears in the secondary 
work.70 More broadly, the “composition, presentation, scale, color 
palette, and media” of the secondary work, as well as its 
“expressive nature”71 (compared with the original) could be seen 
as transformative.  
Most broadly, each author’s purpose in creating work is 
important to determining transformation, and thus, fair use.72 Even 
if the second work is not transformative, the use may be fair if the 
author’s purpose is transformative. Thus, the creation of images 
much smaller than the originals (“thumbnails”) used for internet 
                                                
67 Id. (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 
4,901)). 
68 Id. (citing Leval, supra note 57, at 1111).  
69 E.g., Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253 (2d Cir. 2006); Kienitz v. Sconnie 
Nation LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1051 (W.D. Wis. 2013), aff’d on other grounds, 
766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014). 
70 Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 801 (9th Cir. 2003). 
71 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618, 
(2013). 
72 Blanch , 467 F.3d at 253; Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 
448 F.3d 605, 706 (2d Cir. 2006); Warner Bros. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 513, 539 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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navigation, but not otherwise transformative, has been found to be 
a fair use of the original works.73 
Transformation has also influenced the way in which courts 
approach other aspects of the defendant’s use. For example, 
transformation can mitigate the negative impact of a commercial 
use.74 On the other hand, lack of transformation may have the 
opposite effect, increasing the weight given to such evidence.75 
Important as it is, however, transformation has not superseded 
the other fair use factors.76 It is just one aspect, albeit the most 
important aspect, of the first factor (the “purpose and character of 
the use”).77 The “purpose and character of the use” also depends on 
whether the use is commercial or for nonprofit educational 
purposes, in bad faith, or parody.78 Parody holds a privileged status 
among kinds of use because permission to create parodies is rarely 
given, and they are frequently created for profit, hence 
commercial.79 Before the rise of transformativeness, defendants 
                                                
73 See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1168 (9th Cir. 2007); 
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003).  
74 See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1271 (11th Cir. 
2001).  
75 See On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001). 
76 See id. at 174 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 
U.S. 569, 579 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Although such 
transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of 
copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of 
transformative works.”). 
77 See id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)) (“The heart of the fair use inquiry is into 
the first specified statutory factor identified as ‘the purpose and character of the use.’”). 
78 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d Cir. 1992). 
79 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 596–600 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in the opinion emphasized that a legitimate parody 
must target or comment on the original work, using humor. Id. at 597. It is not enough 
that the work use the original to comment on things other than the original, for 
example society at large or the genre of art to which the original belongs. Id. at 599. 
Kennedy characterized such broader works as “satire,” rather than “parody,” and found 
them less deserving of fair use because the need to copy is less than it is when creating 
a parody. Id. at 597. 
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often claimed that their work was a parody in an attempt to escape 
sanctions in a copyright case.80 Thus, in the first infringement 
lawsuits against Jeff Koons, which took place before 
transformation was widely acknowledged as an important element, 
Koons claimed that his work was parody, as that was the clearest 
route to winning a fair use case for the defendant. 81 For Koons, the 
parody defense was conspicuously unsuccessful.82 Nevertheless, 
parody is still mentioned in appropriation art cases, usually in 
conjunction with transformation.83 
B. Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
The second factor under section 107 is the nature of the 
copyrighted (that is, the copied) 84  work. 85  Courts generally 
consider whether the copied work is a work of imagination or the 
arts (which cuts against fair use), or whether it is more fact-based 
(which tends to cut in favor of fair use).86 Imaginative and artistic 
works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than 
fact-based works, with the consequence that fair use is more 
difficult to establish when the former works are copied.87  
                                                
80 See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980). 
81 See generally Rogers v. Koons, 751 F. Supp. 474 (1990). 
82 See Rogers, 960 F.2d at 310; United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 
F.Supp. 370, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Campbell v. Koons, 91 CIV. 6055 (RO)), 1993 
WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993). 
83 This was the case in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose. 510 U.S. at 599; see also Mattel 
Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir. 2003); Kienitz v. 
Sconnie Nation LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1052 (W.D. Wis. 2013), aff’d, 766 F.3d 
756 (7th Cir. 2014). 
84 The Act uses the term “the copyrighted work” to refer to the work from which 
the user copied. The work to which the user copied is simply referred to as the “use.” If 
the use is fair, then both works are copyrighted. 
85 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012). 
86 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569. 
87 Id. at 586 (Souter, J., majority opinion). The distinction is of less use in a parody 
case, as parodies seem inevitably to “copy publicly known, expressive works.” Id. 
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Many works of appropriation art copy expressive works, which 
are close to the core of copyright protection.  We might expect that 
courts would weigh that factor against fair use in appropriation art 
cases, and so they did, before Campbell.88 As transformation has 
become a crucial concept in fair use, however, the significance of 
the second factor—the nature of the copyrighted work—seemed to 
decline. The Second Circuit has held that when the use is 
transformative, the second factor will not be given much weight.89 
The Ninth Circuit has taken this a step further and held that “the 
more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance 
of other factors.”90 The Second Circuit’s recent appropriation art 
case, Cariou v. Prince, is in accord.91 
C. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
The third statutory fair use factor—the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole—disfavors extensive copying and favors uses that 
appropriate relatively little from their sources. No court has ever 
attempted a bright-line rule about how much can be taken. It is 
clear, though, that “how much” depends on “what for”—that is, 
how much may be taken depends on the use to be made of the 
materials (which is factor one).92 The artist is not limited to taking 
only what is necessary.93  The Supreme Court has found that 
                                                
88 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir. 1992); United Feature 
Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons 817 F. Supp. 370, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
89 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 
(2013); On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that even 
under the best of circumstances, the second factor was “rarely determinative.”). 
90 Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 
at 586 (A similar de-emphasis of this factor has happened in parody cases, in which the 
second factor is not weighed heavily because “parodies almost invariably copy 
publicly known, expressive works.”). 
91 714 F.3d 694, 708 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013) (quoting 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579). 
92 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 589. 
93 Id. at 588. 
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copying an entire work was fair use when the use consisted of 
videotaping broadcast television programs for home, non-
commercial use,94 but all other things being equal, the more that is 
copied, the less likely a finding of fair use.95 
Like the other factors, the third factor seems to have 
diminished in importance with the ascendancy of “transformation” 
in fair use analysis.96 The inquiry regarding “transformation” may 
have completely subsumed this factor, much as it appears to have 
subsumed the second factor. That is, if the use is highly 
transformative, the fact that a lot was copied from the original 
work will not deter a finding of fair use; in fact, sufficient 
transformation has led some courts to conclude that this factor 
weighed in favor of fair use—even when the whole underlying 
work has been copied.97  
D. Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market 
In 1985, the Supreme Court stated that this factor was 
“undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”98 It 
requires courts to consider not only the extent of market harm 
caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also 
“whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged 
in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially adverse 
                                                
94 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 496 (1984). 
95 See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985); 
On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001); Rogers v. Koons, 960 
F.2d 301, 311 (2d Cir. 1992); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 
370, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). But see Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 246, 259 (2d Cir. 
2006) (copying entire work does not rule out fair use). 
96 The Second and Ninth Circuits have said the importance of the other factors 
declines when transformation is found. See supra text accompanying notes 86-93.  
97 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 618 
(2013); Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006); 
Mattell, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003). 
98 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.., 471 U.S. at 566. 
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impact on the potential market” for the original.99 The kind of 
market harm cognizable under this factor is the harm caused by the 
new work’s substitution for the old work in the market.100 It is not 
the suppression of demand for the original work that matters, it is 
usurpation of the demand for the original work.101 
Impact on the market for derivative works may also be 
considered. Courts have not been very consistent in the analysis of 
derivative works in this regard.102 Some courts, taking their cue 
from the cases before them, simply state that it is obviously 
possible that someone else might seek to do the very thing done by 
the defendant but in exchange for payment of a license fee.103 This 
kind of judicial speculation inevitably leads to the conclusion that 
the fourth factor cuts against fair use—one can always imagine the 
defendant paying for her use. However, when there is evidence of 
a market for derivative works—similar to the one created by the 
defendant—and that market would be adversely affected if the 
derivative use were to become widespread, then a market impact 
can be shown.104 
In today’s market for appropriation art, impact on the 
plaintiff’s market is usually negligible.  Although one could always 
speculate that a third party might offer a fee in exchange for the 
right to create a derivative work like the defendant’s, in the 
                                                
99 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (quoting 3 M. NIMMER & 
D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.05 (1993)). 
100 Id. at 570–71.  
101 Id. (finding that most parodies easily pass muster because it is a rare parody 
that can substitute for the original in the marketplace). But see Benny v. Loew’s, Inc., 
239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956) (stating a concern that a parody of the movie Gas Light 
might adversely impact the market for the movie—although this case preceded the 
1976 Act, and therefore did not consider the factors provided therein). 
102 1 Howard B. Abrams, The Law of Copyright § 5:171 (2014).  
103 See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 312 (2d Cir. 1992).  
104  Compare United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (market for sculptures in the shape of a cartoon dog plausible) with 
Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (market for 
“adult-oriented artistic photographs of Barbie” doll not plausible). 
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absence of such a market or plans to create such a market, a court 
should ignore such speculation.  Moreover, as a practical matter, 
the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s works are often not sold in the 
same market.105 Hence, the defendant’s work cannot substitute for 
the plaintiff’s. When the audiences, the purchasers, and the prices 
are different for the two works, it is unlikely that there would be a 
market impact on the plaintiff.106 But, because one can imagine 
copying that does not match this description, analysis of the market 
impact of the copying continues to be important in appropriation 
art cases.107 
V. MODEST PROPOSAL 
The fair use landscape has been transformed by transformation. 
The rise of transformation analysis, based on Judge Leval’s article, 
is nothing short of remarkable. It has affected fair use in nearly 
every context in which fair use can be found. 108  When 
transformation is found, the outcome is nearly always a finding of 
fair use.109 
                                                
105 See e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 
(1985); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).  
106 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 708–09 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 618 (2013).  
107 For example, someone might copy a piece of popular, mass-produced art, and 
sell a large number of copies at about the same price as the original. In such a case, the 
fact that the copies might be called “art” should not shield the user from a claim of 
infringement.  The appropriation art cases to date, however, involve what we might 
think of as “gallery art” and do not involve mass production of copies. 
108 Not every fair use case addresses transformation. A study of fair use judicial 
opinions up to 2005 found that, after Campbell, more than 41% of district court 
opinions, and nearly 19% of circuit court opinions, did not mention transformation. See 
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 604–05 (2008). Nearly 37% of the 68 post-Campbell opinions 
finding fair use did not mention transformation. See id. at 605. The analyzed cases are 
current only through 2005, however, and it is possible that the cases since then have 
increasingly taken up the idea of transformation. 
109 See Beebe, supra note 108, at 606. 
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We would expect, then, that appropriation art has benefited 
from the addition of transformation to the fair use analysis. Indeed, 
it has: the appropriation art cases won by the defendant (i.e., the 
artist) since Campbell were won because of the defendant’s 
“transformation” of the underlying work.110 That must be seen as 
progress: Pre-Campbell, no appropriation artist had won a case, 
while post-Campbell there have to date been three wins for 
appropriation art.111 
Even with transformation, however, fair use is no panacea for 
appropriation artists. To be sure, most appropriation art strives to 
be transformative. It seeks to evoke a different response in the 
viewer than did the original. But, judges can be unpredictable; they 
might not find the work to be transformative, or even insert some 
other limit—for example that the degree of copying exceeded the 
judge’s notion of what is necessary for the artist’s purpose, even if 
the use is transformative.112 
Worse yet for the artist, fair use is an affirmative defense,113 
which can be established only by litigating the question of 
infringement. It is usually litigated after the plaintiff has made at 
least a prima facie case of infringement because if infringement 
cannot be established, there is no need for an affirmative 
defense.114 From an academic perspective, this may seem to pose 
                                                
110 See Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710; Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 253, 256–57, 
259 (2d Cir. 2006); Mattel, 353 F.3d at 806, 811. 
111 See, e.g., Cariou, 714 F.3d 694; Blanch, 467 F.3d 244; Mattel, 353 F.3d 792. 
112 E.g., Warner Bros. Entm’t Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 544 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“A finding of verbatim copying in excess of what is reasonably 
necessary diminishes a finding of a transformative use.”). The idea that a judge, 
lacking any training, experience, or other qualification, would second-guess what was 
“necessary” to achieve the artist’s purpose is dismaying, and disregards Justice 
Holmes’ famous admonishment that “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking for 
persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of 
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.” Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). 
113 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
114 See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986). 
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no problem. After all, judicial opinions are an important 
component of the law that we study. But, a practitioner should 
immediately see the problem: copyright litigation is expensive.115 
Telling artists that they have the right to make fair use of others’ 
works as long as they are willing to litigate the matter is telling 
them that they have all the rights they can afford to buy. To 
allocate the right to create art according to the financial resources 
of the artist is extravagantly protective of existing work at the 
expense of new work.  
The public interest, too, is damaged by applying copyright law 
to suppress appropriation art.116 Copyright’s primary purpose is to 
increase access to copyrighted works.117 Secondarily, it creates 
incentives for authors to create.118 If an author’s incentives are not 
damaged by a use, then, all other things being equal, copyright 
should not prohibit the use.119 Yet, the mechanism for balancing 
those interests, fair use, is so costly that for artists it is inadequate.  
A solution exists that would allow a court to limit the damage 
to the public interest without damaging the authors’ incentive. It is 
both workable and practical. Of course, it would be opposed, but 
even the opponents would find it hard to argue that it would cause 
harm.120  
                                                
115 Professor Litman refers to it as “hideously expensive.” JESSICA LITMAN, 
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 183 (Prometheus Books 2001). 
116 See Schaumann, supra note 1, at 263–65. 
117 Id. at 263. 
118 Id. at 260. 
119 Id. at 264 
120 One fear might be that such a proposal could lead to an industry of so-called 
“artists” making “appropriation art” based on high-value existing works, selling the 
copies as if they were the originals. In other words, favoring appropriation art might 
promote widespread art fraud. But, the art world is already familiar with the problem 
of fraud, and it is a criminal matter. Any connection between copyright rules and art 
fraud is pure speculation.  For their part, copyright owners might prefer that all uses of 
their works, whether harmful or not, be left to their discretion. But the question is not 
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Courts could accomplish this by recognizing that a use that fits 
the definition of a “work of visual art,” as defined in the Copyright 
Act,121  is highly likely to be a fair use. The court would evaluate 
transformativeness, but also should look at harm to the market. In 
this regard, it is hard to imagine a work of visual art harming the 
market for more commercialized works because “works of visual 
art” can exist only in two hundred or fewer copies, signed and 
consecutively numbered. The market for such works is relatively 
small, and it consists of purchasers who are generally sophisticated 
and knowledgeable about what they are purchasing. Buyers in this 
market are familiar with the practice of selling copies of works; 
they are called “reproductions.” There are generally at least two 
differences between a reproduction and a work of appropriation 
art: First, appropriation art itself is attributed to an artist, different 
from the artist who created the original work, whereas 
reproductions are uncredited. Second, the intention of the 
appropriation artist is different from that of the creator of the 
original work, while reproductions seek to simulate the presence of 
the original work. Attribution is enough to take care of most of the 
potential problems that copying might create. For example, Sherri 
                                                                                                         
which rule copyright owners would favor; rather, it is which rule is most in the public 
interest. 
121  A “work of visual art” is (1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in 
a single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and 
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, 
carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are consecutively numbered by the 
author and bear the signature or other identifying mark of the author; or (2) a still 
photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a single copy 
that is signed by the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are 
signed and consecutively numbered by the author. A work of visual art does not 
include—(A)(i) any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, 
applied art, motion picture or other audiovisual work, book, magazine, newspaper, 
periodical, data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar 
publication; (ii) any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, 
covering, or packaging material or container; (iii) any portion or part of any item 
described in clause (i) or (ii); (B) any work made for hire; or (C) any work not subject 
to copyright protection under this title. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). 
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Levine’s photographs of photographs taken by Edward Weston 
would not compete in the art market with the Weston originals: 
Levine’s practice of naming those works After Edward Weston and 
signing her works would take care of that.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Appropriation art is a legitimate and long-standing art form 
practiced by many twentieth- and twenty-first century artists. 
Copyright law, which is intended to promote access to creative 
works, has struggled to come to grips with appropriation art 
because this kind of art uses preexisting works as its subject 
material; it comments on culture using the icons of culture.  
Because appropriation art copies without the permission of the 
copyright holder, copyright law tends to sweep it into the category 
of infringement. However, unlike most copying, appropriation art 
does not raise the problems of unauthorized exploitation and 
usurpation of the market for the original.  
A relatively easy solution is available. Courts should recognize 
the legitimacy of appropriation art as an artistic practice and take 
account of the lack of danger to existing art markets posed by 
appropriation artists, as long as the copying takes the form of a 
“work of visual art” as defined in the Copyright Act. The common 
characteristics of such works, described in this definition, are 
enough to assure that no significant harm can result from the 
practice. That lack of harm together with the primary purpose of 
copyright—to increase access to creative works—are enough to 
suggest that appropriation artists should win all or nearly all the 
infringement cases brought against them. 
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